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The essay firstly in Chapter 1 points out the unilateral character of schedules by 
analyzing its negotiation and conclusion processes. Then it questions schedules’ treaty 
status after it applies Article 2 of VCLT to schedules.   
    The essay goes on in Chapter 2 to introduce the international customary rules of 
treaty interpretation, paving the way for the later analysis of the application of those 
rules to the interpretation of commitment schedules. In Subchapter 2, the essay 
discusses several typical WTO cases which involve the interpretation of commitment 
schedules, including US-Gambling Services, EC-Computer Equipment, etc, and 
analyzes the customary interpretation rules and other interpretation methods the DSU 
panel and appellate body applied to those cases, which covered the general 
interpretation rules under Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT). In the 
process, the essay focuses on DSB’s application of Article 31 and Article 32 of VCLT 
to interpreting commitment schedules, and the problems that have come up, some of 
which are the treaty status of commitment schedules, the conflict between schedule’s 
unilateral nature and its being a component of WTO treaty, the influence of such 
conflict on schedules’ interpretation and the application and interpretation of VCLT 
itself, especially Article 31 and Article 32. In the last section of Chapter 2, the essay 
also tries to explore the possibility of applying rules other than VCLT to schedules’ 
interpretation.  
In Chapter 3, the essay lists what can be learned from those cases to improve 
the trade strategy of China respectively in drafting schedules and in dispute settlement, 
and proposes several ways to achieve so, based on the position and choice of DSB in 
those disputes’ resolution. 
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①
朱和卿.WTO 条约解释论[J]. 法制与社会.2007,(1):125-126. 































第一章  承诺清单概述 
 3
第一章  承诺清单概述 
 在 WTO 争端解决机构中进行的贸易争端涉及到贸易领域的方方面面，从
农产品到钢铁，从纺织品到电信服务，从反倾销到反补贴，而涉及到的成员国
也几乎占满 WTO的整个席位，不管是作为争端的申诉方、被诉方还是第三方。
虽然专家组和上诉机构已经将《维也纳条约法公约》第 31 条和第 32 条奉为解释
WTO 条约的国际习惯规则，但是在具体案件中如何运用这些条款还存在法律交
锋，比如涉及到承诺清单解释的争端。在美国-博彩案中，主要争议就是 GATS
协议附件里美国服务清单的第 10.D 章节中“other recreational services (except 
sporting)”的通常含义；在韩国-政府采购案中，专家组需要找出《政府采购协
议》中韩国清单里的“central government entities”包括有哪些机构；在欧共体-











（以下简称 GATT1994）第 2 条进行规范。对农产品来说，承诺还包括关税配额、
对出口补贴的限制以及一些特殊种类的国内支持。每一个 WTO 成员的承诺清单
中如果有关税减让义务方面的改动，这个 WTO 成员都需要与其贸易伙伴进行谈
                                                        


























约国，《国际商品统一分类制度公约》仍然在所有的承诺清单中被当作标准格式。       
货物承诺清单是在 GATT1994 的框架之下（根据 GATT1994 第 2 条第 7 款），









WTO 成员国都有所参与（根据 GATT1994 第 28 条第 2 款第 2 项）。在任何情况
下，谈判都应该考虑到每个成员国及其产业的需要，欠发达国家的需要，以及其
它的相关因素（根据 GATT1994 第 28 条第 3 款）。GATT1994 的第 27 条和第 28
                                                        
① GATT1994 Article 28，http://www.wto.org. 











































                                                        
① 洪德钦.法律与政策专题研究[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社，2004.4. 
② DAMME, ISABELLE V. The Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments [J]. Journal of World 
Trade, 2007, 41(1):6. 
③ Id. 
④ Panel Report, Korea-Government Procurement, para 7.44. 



















第二节  承诺清单的性质 








端解决谅解》（以下简称 DSU）第 3 条第 2 款中确定的多边贸易体系的安全性和








的因素。本文除了讨论将 《维也纳条约法公约》第 2 条第 1 款第 1 项中的“条
约”定义适用于承诺清单以外，也会讨论对承诺清单的其它定性方式—— “单
边行为”或者 “具有特殊性质的多边行为”。但是，现在仍然不能确定的是这些
                                                        
①Appellate Body Report, EC-Computer Equipment，para.84；Appellate Body Report, EC-Poultry, para.82；
Appellate Body Report, Canada-Milk Dairy，paras.131-133；Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef，paras.96-97；
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